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On Making and Breaking Contracts 
Roger Bernhardt 
Two different decisions from the (almost) same panel of the Second District Court of Appeal 
in Los Angeles came down within two days of each other with enough commonality to provoke 
me into writing one column covering both cases. 
I. Was a Contract Really Made? 
When a seller strings his potential buyer along, secretly hoping to be able to make a better deal 
with someone else, and then ultimately does not go hr ugh with the first one, what sort of 
wrong, if any, has he committed? That is the issue raised in Simon v San Paolo U.S. Holding Co. 
(2003) 113 CA4th 1137, 7 CR2d 367, reported at p 15. And because the amount of damages an 
aggrieved buyer is entitled to recover varies substantially according to one’s conception of the 
wrong involved, that issue may turn out to have large monetary consequences. 
In Simon, the putative buyer believed that a series of letters between the parties constituted a 
contract; and while there was substantial evidence to support his point of view (according to the 
court of appeal), the jury found that there was no e forceable contract between the parties, thus 
taking his breach of contract theory out of the case. However, instead of declaring that there was 
a contract, the jury found the seller bank guilty of fraud—apparently for telling the buyer a lot of 
lies during the negotiations—and held the bank liable for $2.5 million in punitive damages. A 
second jury, re-ruling solely on the damages, awarded $1.7 million, confirming the opinion that 
the seller must have behaved pretty badly. 
A major problem with the amount of punitive damages was that it was supported by an award 
of only $5000 for out-of-pocket losses—actual damages under CC §3343—or 1/340 as much as 
the punitives. That large a disparity can get a plaintiff into trouble under the Constitution as a 
denial of due process. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court had twice ordered the state 
courts to take a harder look at it. 
The punitive award ultimately was upheld by the court of appeal on the ground that it was 
only about four times the buyer’s “benefit of the bargain” loss (i.e., $400,000—the difference 
between the contract price of $1.1 million and the buyer’s estimated $1.5 million market value 
for the property). Taking a somewhat novel line, the court held that the constitutional 
requirement of a reasonable relationship between punitives and actuals does not oblige the ratio 
to be limited by the damages allowed only by statute. Although “benefit of the bargain” loss is 
not included under CC §3343 (except in special cases), it can be used as the multiplier in 
calculating the propriety of punitive damages. 
Since I am not an expert on the general rules of damages, I cannot say much about the 
multiplier argument. But what does surprise me, as a real estate matter, is why the buyer’s actual 
damages were restricted to his out-of-pocket loss at all. 
What if a party is defrauded out of a contract rather than into one? 
Civil Code §3343(a) imposes its measure of damages on a party who was “defrauded in the 
purchase, sale or exchange of property.” I have always taken it for granted that this language 
referred to a buyer who was defrauded into purchasing property, not one who, as here, was 
defrauded out of purchasing it. The statute does not fit well in cases where there may have been 
fraud but no contract. I think that fraudulent but frustrated real estate deals fall more readily 
under our general fraud statutes—CC §§1709 and 3333. 
It is not as if §3343 offers such a good measure of damages that plaintiffs ought to want to fit 
their claims under it. In hindsight, the legislature probably made a mistake when it adopted this 
section (a minority position nationally) in 1935, limiting damages to the “difference between the 
actual value of that with which the defrauded person parted and the actual value of that which he 
received” in real estate sales. This niggardly formula drives courts to make regular exceptions to 
it (as, for instance, in the fraudulent-broker cases, e.g., Salahutdin v Valley of Cal., Inc. (1994) 
24 CA4th 555, 29 CR2d 463, reported in 17 CEB RPLR 220 (July 1994)) and forced the 
legislature itself into adding amendments to soften i s impact. In this case, it would have made a 
lot more sense for the jury to have been able to award a healthier measure of actual damages 
rather than having to convert punitive damages into a back-door substitute for them. 
I wish I could come up with a drafting suggestion t handle this issue, but that is hard to 
propose when the problem is that the contract itself was never executed. 
II. Was a Contract Properly Cancelled? 
What rights does one party have to get out of a sale contract when the other has failed to 
perform within her deadlines? According to Miller & Starr, the decisions on this issue “are not 
consistent.” 1 Miller & Starr, California Real Estate §1:162 (3d ed 2000). That is putting it 
mildly. I often cannot make head nor tail out of them, as happened again when I tried to 
comprehend Galdjie v Darwish (2003) 113 CA4th 1331, 7 CR2d 178, reported at p 25. 
In Galdjie, the contract was supposed to have closed on April 9, but had not. The buyer got his 
loan commitment on May 12; however, on May 13 the seller cancelled, which led the buyer to 
sue her for specific performance. The buyer prevaild both at trial and on appeal, which I think 
was right, but the explanation given by the court casts more fog than sunshine on the issue of 
why the seller was not entitled to withdraw. 
The court’s opinion was to the effect that, but for the seller’s conduct after April 9, which 
waived the deadline (and a tendency on her part to “manufacture evidence after the fact”), the 
contract would have automatically ended on that day. The court endorsed the statement from a 
1992 decision that “where the parties have made tim of the essence of the contract, at the 
expiration of time without tender by either party, both parties are discharged.” Pittman v Canham 
(1992) 2 CA4th 556, 560, 3 CR2d 340. While Miller & Starr do not think that is really the rule 
(nor do I), attorneys advising buyers should warn them that that can happen unless certain steps 
are taken. 
When does a contract run out of steam? 
The starting point is a contract that includes a closing date which does not make time of the 
essence. (A more fundamental starting point might be a contract that does not even include a 
closing date, as in House of Prayer v Evangelical Ass’n (2003) 113 CA4th 48, 7 CR2d 24; but 
that occurs too rarely to take seriously.) Theoretically, the rules are the same whether it is the 
seller or the buyer who is late, but because buyers s em to need more time coming up with the 
money than do sellers to get their titles in order, l t us suppose the buyer is late: If time is not 
made of the essence, it is treated as nonessential, me ning a buyer can pay late and his seller 
must accept it; since a court will always give the buyer reasonable time to perform, the seller 
might as well do the same. The best strategy for the seller to follow is, either before or when the 
specified day arrives, to set a new date, reasonably f r away, and to inform her buyer that she 
will withdraw if he has not performed by then. 
Does the presence of a “time of the essence” clause make such advice unnecessary? This 
opinion seems to say yes, disagreeing with the conclusion of Miller & Starr that the weight of 
authority is the other way. (Although I said the same back in 1967 when I wrote, “At best the 
[time is of the essence] clause seems to permit a party to insist on the contract date and, after 
timely tender and notice, to reject belated attempts at performance by the other.” California Real 
Property Sales Transactions §11.7 (Cal CEB 1967)). Under the Miller & Starr/Bernhardt reading 
of the cases, the contract terminates on that day only if (my italics) the seller has given the buyer 
an appropriate “drop dead” notice beforehand. 
If the Pittman/Galdjie rule is correct, however, then a buyer goes out of contract if he does not 
have his down payment and loan funds in escrow by the original closing date. He is saved only if 
his seller said or did something to the contrary that is held to have effectively waived the closing 
date; mere tardiness would not be enough. Under that principle, a seller who wants out need only 
keep her mouth shut before the closing day and afterwards notify everybody that she has 
withdrawn. And a buyer, foreseeing delays, ought to do everything possible to get the seller’s 
written consent to an extension in advance. 
Given the existence of inconsistent rules on this question, attorneys should counsel their 
clients on the basis of a worst-case scenario, advising a buyer that he risks being out of contract 
if he fails to either perform on time or get a provable extension giving him more time; and, in the 
case of a seller, instructing her to send a notice in advance when she wants to terminate even 
though there is a “time of the essence” clause. 
A seller should also satisfy the possible additional requirement of performing, herself, all 
concurrent conditions fully and on time. She should be sure to deposit her deed in escrow before 
sending any termination notice. (It is so easy to actu lly send a deed to the escrow agent that it is 
unwise to tender that performance instead, thereby inviting a dispute over whether those acts 
really did amount to a satisfactory “tender,” a not very clear concept in the first place. The 
escrow instructions themselves always call for nondelivery of the deed to the buyer until he pays, 
which is protection enough.) 
The presence of the standard escrow clause—providing that if escrow does not close on time, 
the escrow agent should close as soon as possible ther after unless one of the parties had 
previously sent a written cancellation—may change some of this. Thus, if the “time-essence” 
clause was held to make time absolutely essential, a court could say that the language in the 
escrow instructions nevertheless converted automatic discharge into discharge only after notice 
(although there was such a clause in Galdjie). If the clause was held to make time only 
potentially essential (i.e., a warning notice still had to be sent), it would still generate questions 
about the interrelationship of the different notices that should go to the buyer and the escrow 
agent, and whether one can perform the function of the other. The additional presence in the 
contract of a clause authorizing the broker to extend the time for performance will create even 
more complications, its effect possibly depending o whether the broker was the seller’s agent, a 
dual agent, or the buyer’s agent. 
Many other clauses that deal with the right to extend a contingency period rather than a 
performance deadline add further uncertainty to all f this. Lawyers can live under almost any set 
of rules, but in too many residential cases, buyers and sellers are on their own and without legal 
guidance. Since instructive legislation is unlikely, and it is even more unlikely to expect people 
to return to the old practice of having attorneys draft their sale and purchase contracts for them, I 
wish that publishers of legal forms would improve th ir products to give the parties clearer, and 
more, consequences to choose from rather than simply to leave the omnipresent “time is of the 
essence” clause as it is.  
 
